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Abstract 
 
In recent years, some cryptographic algorithms have 
gained  popularity  due  to  properties  that  make  them 
suitable for use in constrained environments like mobile 
information appliances, where computing resources and 
power availability are limited. In this paper, we select a 
set  of  public-key,  symmetric-key  and  hash  algorithms 
suitable for such environments and study their workload 
characteristics.  In  particular,  we  study  elliptic-curve 
versions  of  public-key  cryptography  algorithms,  which 
allow  fast  software  implementations  while  reducing  the 
key size needed for a desired level of security compared to 
previous  integer-based  public-key  algorithms.  We 
characterize  the  operations  needed  by  elliptic-curve 
analogs  of  Diffie-Hellman  key  exchange,  ElGamal  and 
the  Digital  Signature  Algorithm  for  public-key 
cryptography, for different key sizes and different levels of 
software optimization. We also include characterizations 
for  the  Advanced  Encryption  Standard  (AES)  for 
symmetric-key  cryptography,  and  SHA  as  a  hash 
algorithm.  We  show  that  all  these  algorithms  can  be 
implemented efficiently with a very simple processor. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
With  the  proliferation  of  handheld  wireless 
information  appliances,  the  ability  to  perform  security 
functions with limited computing resources has become 
increasingly  important.  In  mobile  devices  such  as 
personal  digital  assistants  (PDAs)  and  multimedia  cell 
phones [5], the processing resources, memory and power 
are all very limited, but the need for secure transmission 
of information  may increase due to the vulnerability to 
attackers of the publicly accessible wireless transmission 
channel. The problem is further compounded by the fact 
that  security  algorithms  can  be  very  compute-intensive, 
which conflicts with the scarce resources available in such 
a mobile platform.  
New  smaller  and  faster  security  algorithms  provide 
part of the solution. In symmetric-key cryptography for 
example,  the  Advanced  Encryption  Standard  (AES) 
[2,17,18,20]  became  the  new  U.S.  federal  standard  for 
block encryption and it is much leaner and faster than the 
previous Data Encryption Standard (DES) [19], which it 
is  intended  to  replace.  Likewise,  the  Elliptic  Curve 
Cryptography  (ECC)  [1,10,16]  provides  a  faster 
alternative  for  public-key  cryptography.  Much  smaller 
key lengths are required with ECC to provide a desired 
level of security, which means faster key exchanges, user 
authentication,  signature  generation  and  verification,  in 
addition to smaller key storage needs.  
Even  though  much  literature  exists  about  these 
algorithms  that  focus  on  algorithmic  optimizations  and 
hardware  implementations  [6,7,8,23],  workload 
characterization studies are very rare. In this paper,  we 
provide  a  comprehensive  workload  characterization  of 
security algorithms suitable for constrained environments. 
We consider elliptic curve analogs of Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange  (EC-DHKE),  ElGamal  (EC-ElGamal)  and  the 
Digital  Signature  Algorithm  (EC-DSA)  for  public-key 
cryptography; the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
for  symmetric-key  cryptography;  and  the  Secure  Hash 
Algorithm  (SHA)  [22]  as  a  hash  algorithm  for  data 
integrity. 
 
2. Algorithm set 
We  consider  four  broad  categories  of  security 
functions: (1) public-key algorithms, which are required 
for  key  exchanges;  (2)  signature  algorithms,  which  are 
required  for  user  authentication;  (3)  symmetric-key 
algorithms,  which  are  required  to  encrypt  and  decrypt 
messages  for  confidentiality;  (4)  hash  functions,  which 
are  used  to  verify  the  integrity  of  messages.  Table  1 
shows  which  specific  algorithms  are  used  as 
representative of each of these classes.  
In  general,  we  have  chosen  to  study  the  newer 
algorithms  from  each  class  that  are  suitable  for 
constrained  environments,  and  about  which  there  have 
been  few  workload  characterization  studies.  The  only 
exception is the Secure Hash Algorithm [22], which has 
been  a  standard  since  1993,  but  is  included  for 
completeness.   
Because elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algorithms 
involve mathematical operations that may be new to the 
architecture  community,  we  describe  important  ECC 
characteristics in the following sections. 
 
Table 1 Algorithm set 
 
Class  Algorithm(s) 
Public-key 
Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange (EC-DHKE) [23], elliptic-
curve ElGamal (EC-ElGamal) [15] 
Signature  Elliptic-curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm (EC-DSA) [21] 
Symmetric-key  Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) [17] 
Hash  Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) [22] 
 
3. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) 
3.1. Advantages of ECC 
Elliptic  curves  as  mathematical  objects  have  been 
known  and  studied  since  long  before  digital  computers 
were built, but their application in cryptography has been 
more recent. In 1985, Victor Miller [16] and Neil Koblitz 
[10] suggested independently that elliptic curves could be 
used  to  perform  public-key  security  functions  (e.g.  key 
exchanges,  digital  signatures).  Furthermore,  certain 
unique properties of elliptic curves  made them resilient 
against the types of attacks that were successful against 
integer-based  algorithms.  Therefore  an  elliptic-curve 
algorithm (e.g. Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
= EC-DSA) could have the same level of security of a 
similar  integer-based  algorithm  (e.g.  Digital  Signature 
Algorithm = DSA) using much fewer key bits. Table 2 
shows  the  number  of  key  bits  necessary  to  have 
equivalent levels of security for integer-based algorithms 
versus elliptic-curve algorithms.  
 
Table 2 Key lengths (in bits) for equivalent security 
 
Integer algorithm  
(e.g. DSA) 
Elliptic-curve algorithm  
(e.g. EC-DSA) 
512  106 
768  132 
1024  160 
2048  210 
21000  600 
For  the  most  commonly  used  1024-bit  keys  for  an 
integer-based  algorithm,  the  elliptic-curve  counterpart 
only  requires  160-bit  keys  for  the  equivalent  security. 
This is a 7x reduction in the space required to store these 
keys,  or  a  similar  reduction  in  bandwidth  required  to 
transmit these keys over a wireless network. Furthermore, 
this  reduction  in  the  size  of  data  objects  allows  much 
faster completion of the algorithms. 
Because of these favorable properties, ECC has been 
incorporated  into  many  security  standards.  Most 
importantly, it was added to FIPS 186-2 [21] and IEEE 
P1363 [9] in 2000.  
 
3.2. Parameters for ECC 
Implementation  of  elliptic  curve  cryptography 
involves  the  selection  of  a  suitable  elliptic  curve 
(determined  by  the  coefficients  in  the  elliptic  curve 
equation),  the  representation  of  field  elements  (e.g.  a 
binary  field  or  a  prime  field),  algorithms  for  field 
arithmetic  and  elliptic-curve  arithmetic.  The  standards 
provide suggestions for the selection of elliptic curves and 
representation  of  field  elements.  FIPS  186-2  [21] 
recommends a total of ten curves for binary fields: two 
different curves for each of 163-bit, 233-bit, 283-bit, 409-
bit and 571-bit fields. We limit the scope of this study to 
these ten curves on binary fields, and choose polynomial 
basis representation for the field elements, which allows 
faster implementation on programmable processors.  
The  next  section  reviews  the  basic  arithmetic 
operations on polynomials, such as polynomial addition 
and multiplication, which we will be using frequently in 
the security algorithms. 
 
4. Polynomial arithmetic 
In  the  polynomial  basis  representation  of  a  binary 
field, each field element can be viewed as a polynomial 
whose  coefficients  are  either  0  or  1.  As  an  example, 
consider the 163-bit binary field, also denoted GF(2
163), 
recommended  in  [21].  The  following  two  polynomials 
a(x) and b(x) are elements of this field: 
a(x) = x
7 + x
5 + x
3 + x + 1, b(x) = x
162 + x
100 + x
3 
In polynomial addition, the coefficients of the same 
powers  of  x  are  added  component-wise.  Since  a 
coefficient can only be 0 or 1, this corresponds to an XOR 
operation on the coefficients. For example, a(x) is added 
to b(x) to yield c(x) as: 
c(x) = a(x) + b(x) = x
162 + x
100 + x
7 + x
5 + x + 1 
(notice that x
3 terms have vanished) 
In a software implementation for a 64-bit ISA, each of 
the polynomials above will fit into three registers, and a 
single  polynomial  addition  will  therefore  require  three 
XOR instructions (Algorithm 1).  
Similar to addition, polynomial multiplication is also 
component-wise. The key difference is that multiplication 
may produce a product polynomial that is longer than the 
multiplicands. Whenever the product is a polynomial of 
degree  greater  than  162,  it  needs  to  be  reduced by  the 
irreducible polynomial p(x) = x
163 + x
7 + x
6 + x
3 + 1 that 
is specified in [21]. 
  
 
Algorithm 1
1 Polynomial addition 
INPUT:  Binary  polynomials  a(x)  and  b(x)  of  degree  at 
most 162 
OUTPUT: c(x) = a(x) + b(x) 
1. For i from 0 to 2 do 
1.1.  ] [ ] [ ] [ i b i a i c Å =  
2. Return c(x) 
 
 
Algorithm 2
2 Shift-and-add polynomial multiplication 
INPUT:  Binary  polynomials  a(x)  and  b(x)  of  degree  at 
most 162 
OUTPUT: c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod p(x) 
1. If a0 = 1 then c(x) = b(x); else c(x) = 0; 
2. For i from 1 to 162 do 
2.1. b(x) ￿ b(x)x mod p(x) 
2.2. If ai = 1 then c(x) = c(x) + b(x) 
3. Return c(x) 
 
 
Algorithm 3 Comb method with windows of width = 4 
for polynomial multiplication 
INPUT:  Binary  polynomials  a(x)  and  b(x)  of  degree  at 
most 162 
OUTPUT: c(x) = a(x)b(x) 
1.  Compute  Tu  =  u(x)b(x)  for  all  polynomials  u(x)  of 
degree at most 3. 
2. c(x) = 0. 
3. For k from 15 downto 0 do 
3.1. For j from 0 to 3 do 
Let u = (u3,u2,u1,u0) where ui is bit (4k+i) of a[j]. 
Add Tu to (c[5],c[4],…,c[j]). 
3.2. If k != 0 then c(x) = c(x)x
4. 
4. Return c(x). 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Nomenclature  for  algorithm  descriptions:  Polynomials  are 
represented  using  lower-case  letters:  a(x),  b(x),  c(x)  etc.  When 
addressing the individual 64-bit words of a polynomial, square brackets 
are used: a[0], b[1], c[2] etc. a[0] represents the lowest-order (least-
significant)  word  of  a(x).  When  addressing  the  individual  bits  of  a 
polynomial, a subscript is used: a0, b32, c162 etc. The bit a0 represents the 
least-significant bit of a(x), and a162 represents the most-significant bit. 
The operator  Å  represents an XOR operation. When used, p(x) denotes 
the irreducible polynomial generating the field. For GF(2
163), p(x) = x
163 
+ x
7 + x
6 + x
3 + 1. 
2 In Step 2.1, b(x)x mod p(x) can be easily computed in two steps as 
follows.  First  shift b(x)  to the  left  by  one  bit  (which corresponds to 
multiplication by x); second, check the 163
rd bit of the shifted result, and 
add p(x) to it if this bit is one (which corresponds to modular reduction). 
 
Algorithm 4
3 Polynomial reduction (adapted from [8] for 
64-bit datapath). 
INPUT: Binary polynomial c(x) of degree at most 324. 
OUTPUT: c(x) mod p(x), where p(x) = x
163 + x
7 + x
6 + x
3 
+ 1. 
1. For i from 5 downto 3 do 
1.1. t = c[i]. 
1.2. c[i-3] = c[i-3]  Å  (t << 29) Å  (t << 32)  
            Å  (t << 35) Å  (t << 36). 
1.3. c[i-2] =  c[i-2] Å  (t >> 28) Å  (t >> 29)  
            Å  (t >> 32) Å  (t >> 35). 
2. t = c[5] & 0xFFFFFFF800000000. 
3. c[0] = c[0] Å  (t >> 28) Å  (t >> 29)  
          Å  (t >> 32) Å  (t >> 35). 
4. c[2] = c[2] & 0x00000007FFFFFFFF. 
5. Return (c[2],c[1],c[0]). 
 
 
Algorithm  5  Table  lookup  method  for  polynomial 
squaring 
INPUT: Binary polynomial a(x) 
OUTPUT: c(x) = a
2(x) 
1.  Precomputation:  For  each  byte  v  =  (v7,v6,…,v1,v0), 
compute the 16-bit quantity T(v) = (0, v7, 0, v6, … , 0, v1, 
0, v0). 
2. For i from 0 to 5 do 
2.1. Let a[i] = (u7,u6,u5,u4,u3,u2,u1,u0), where each uj is 
a byte. 
2.2. c[2i] = (T(u1),T(u0)), c[2i+1] = (T(u3),T(u2)). 
3. Return c(x). 
 
 
Algorithm 6
4 Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) for 
polynomial inversion 
INPUT: Binary polynomial a(x),  0 ) ( ¹ x a  
OUTPUT:  ) ( mod ) (
1 x p x a
-  
1. b(x) = 1, c(x) = 0, u(x) = a(x), v(x) = p(x). 
2. While degree(u(x)) ¹  0 do 
2.1. j = degree(u(x)) – degree(v(x)). 
2.2. If j < 0 then u(x) « v(x), b(x) « c(x), j = -j. 
2.3. u(x) = u(x) + x
jv(x), b(x) = b(x) + x
jc(x) 
3. Return b(x). 
 
 
                                                 
3 The operator << denotes logical left shift, >> denotes logical right 
shift, & denotes bitwise AND. 
4  ) (
1 x a
-   denotes  the  multiplicative  inverse  of  ) (x a ,  such  that 
1 ) ( mod ) ( ) ( ) ( mod ) ( ) (
1 1 = =
- - x p x a x a x p x a x a .  The  operator  «  
denotes a swap of the two values on either side.  
Algorithm  7  Modified  Almost  Inverse  Algorithm 
(MAIA)
5 [8,23] for polynomial inversion 
INPUT: Binary polynomial a(x),  0 ) ( ¹ x a  
OUTPUT:  ) 2 ( ) (
k GF x b Î   and  ] 1 2 , 0 [ - Î k t   such  that 
) ( mod ) ( ) ( x p x x a x b
t º  
 
1. b(x) = 1, c(x) = 0, u(x) = a(x), v(x) = p(x), t = 0. 
2. While x divides u(x) do 
2.1. u(x) = u(x) / x, c(x) = c(x) x, t = t + 1. 
3. If u(x) = 1, return (b(x),t). 
4. If degree(u(x)) < degree(v(x)) then u(x)  « v(x), b(x) 
« c(x). 
5. u(x) = u(x) + x
jv(x), b(x) = b(x) + c(x). 
6. Go to Step 2. 
 
The simplest algorithm for polynomial multiplication 
is  the  shift-and-add  algorithm  (Algorithm  2).  It  is 
presented  for  illustrative  purposes  because  of  its 
simplicity.  The  second  algorithm,  Algorithm  3,  is 
described in [8] and is significantly faster than the shift-
and-add algorithm but requires more storage for the table 
lookups involved.  
Algorithm 2 differs from Algorithm 3 in that it does 
not  perform  reduction  along  with  multiplication.  In 
Algorithm 2, reduction happens in each iteration in Step 
2.1.  Therefore,  a  separate  polynomial  reduction 
(Algorithm 4) needs to follow Algorithm 3 each time it is 
used.  
Polynomial  squaring  can  be  performed  using 
Algorithms 2 or 3 to  multiply the input polynomial by 
itself.  However  a  dedicated  algorithm  for  polynomial 
squaring  gives  faster  results.  Algorithm  5  is  a  table-
lookup based method and it exploits the linearity of the 
squaring operation in binary fields. If  i
i i x a x a ￿ = = 162
0 ) ( , 
then  i
i i x a x a 2 162
0
2 ) ( ￿ = = . This operation corresponds to 
inserting zeros between the consecutive bits in the binary 
representation of a(x). This is facilitated by using a 512-
byte table that is precomputed to hold the 16-bit squares 
of each 8-bit polynomial [8]. 
For polynomial inversion, we present two algorithms: 
Extended  Euclidean  Algorithm  (EEA)  [15]  and  the 
Modified  Almost  Inverse  Algorithm  (MAIA)  [8,23]
5. 
These are summarized as Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 7 
respectively. EEA is a basic but slow algorithm that we 
provide for illustration, whereas the MAIA (and similar 
variants  of  the  Almost  Inverse  Algorithm)  is  typically 
used in optimized implementations. While EEA is a direct 
extension  of  the  basic  Euclidean  algorithm  used  for 
integers,  the  reader  is  referred  to  [8]  and  [23]  for  the 
details of MAIA.  
                                                 
5  Almost  Inverse  Algorithm  was  originally  described  in [23].  In  this 
study,  we  use  a  modified  version  of  that  algorithm  called  Modified 
Almost Inverse Algorithm, which is described in [8]. 
5. Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
This  section  focuses  on  the  elliptic-curve  Diffie-
Hellman  key  exchange  as  an  example  to  illustrate  the 
differences  of  elliptic-curve  algorithms  from  integer 
algorithms. We first review the integer version. 
 
5.1. Diffie-Hellman key exchange (integer) 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHKE) [3] is used to 
establish a shared key between two parties over a public 
channel.  It  is  based  on  the  multiplicative  group 
*
p Z   of 
integers, where p is a prime. Figure 1 shows how a secret 
key,  K,  is  agreed  upon  between  Alice  and  Bob  by 
exchanging two quantities aT and bT publicly. We assume 
that the two parties Alice and Bob have agreed on p and 
a  values in advance, where  a is a primitive element of 
the group 
*
p Z .  
 
Step  Alice    Bob 
1 
Choose random a 
] 2 , 2 [ - Î p a  
  Choose random b 
] 2 , 2 [ - Î p b  
2 
Compute aT 
p a
a
T mod a =  
  Compute bT 
p b
b
T mod a =  
3  Send aT  
Receive bT 
aT ￿ 
￿ bT 
Receive aT  
Send bT 
4 
Compute key K 
p
p b K
ab
a
T
mod     
mod ) (
a =
=
 
  Compute key K 
p
p a K
ab
b
T
mod     
mod ) (
a =
=
 
Figure 1 Diffie-Hellman key exchange (integer) 
The security of the integer Diffie-Hellman is based on 
the Discrete Logarithm problem: given p,a  and aT, it is 
computationally infeasible to compute a (for sufficiently 
large  p).  Therefore,  even  though  an  eavesdropper  may 
capture  the  intermediate  values  aT  and  bT  as  they  are 
exchanged over the public channel, neither a nor b will be 
exposed,  and  therefore  the  final  key  K  remains  known 
only to Alice and Bob. 
 
5.2. Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
 
Elliptic-curve  Diffie-Hellman  key  exchange  (EC-
DHKE) is similar to the integer version except that it uses 
the points on an elliptic-curve rather than integers (Figure 
2). We assume that Alice and Bob have previously agreed 
on a binary field GF(2
k), a common elliptic curve E with 
suitable coefficients
6, and a base point P=(x,y), which lies 
on E and has order n. 
 
                                                 
6  An  elliptic  curve  must  have  certain  properties  to  be  suitable  for 
cryptographic use. A good overview of these is provided in [1].  
Step  Alice    Bob 
1 
Choose random a 
] 1 , 2 [ - Î n a  
  Choose random b 
] 1 , 2 [ - Î n b  
2 
Compute AT 
a P AT ´ =  
  Compute BT 
b P BT ´ =  
3  Send AT  
Receive BT 
AT ￿ 
￿ BT 
Receive AT  
Send BT 
4 
Compute key K 
b a P
a B K T
´ ´ =
´ =
    
 
  Compute key K 
b a P
b A K T
´ ´ =
´ =
    
 
 
Figure 2
7 Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
 
Table 3 Comparison of integer Diffie-Hellman and 
elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchanges 
 
  DHKE  EC-DHKE 
Group  Integers in 
*
p Z   Points on the 
elliptic curve E 
Base object 
* Î p Z a   Elliptic curve point 
E PÎ  
Primary 
operation 
Exponentiation 
( p
a mod a ) 
Point multiplication 
( a P´ ) 
Key length
8  1024 bits  160 bits 
 
The security of the EC-DHKE is based on the elliptic-
curve Discrete Logarithm problem:  given GF(2
k), E, P, 
AT,  it  is  computationally  infeasible  to  compute  a  (for 
sufficiently  large  k  and  n).  Unlike  the  integer  discrete 
logarithm  problem,  the  elliptic  curve  discrete  logarithm 
problem  has  no  known  sub-exponential  time  solutions 
(for  a  well-chosen  set  of  system  parameters
6). 
Accordingly,  a  given  level  of  security  can  be  achieved 
with  a  k  smaller  than  the  number  of  bits  required  to 
encode the p in the integer Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 
Table 3 provides a comparison of the basic features of 
1024-bit integer Diffie-Hellman and 160-bit elliptic-curve 
Diffie-Hellman key exchanges. 
 
6. Point multiplication on elliptic curves 
Steps 2 and 4 in Figure 2 involve operations on the 
elliptic  curve  points.  The  operator  ´   denotes  the 
multiplication of an elliptic curve point by a field element. 
                                                 
7  Nomenclature  for  Figure  2:  a  and  b  are  scalars.  A  scalar  is  an 
element of the field  GF(2
k). As  explained in Section 4, addition and 
multiplication of two scalars is polynomial addition and multiplication 
respectively. P, AT and BT are points on the elliptic curve. Each point on 
the elliptic curve is determined by its two coordinates. Example: P = 
(x,y).  The  coordinates  of  points  are  elements  of  the  field  GF(2
k). 
Addition of two points on the elliptic curve is called point addition and 
it is performed with the sequence of formulas described in Section 6. 
The result of such a point addition is another point on the curve. The 
operator  ´   denotes  point  multiplication.  Example:  a P AT ´ = , 
whereby the point P on the elliptic curve is added to itself a times. The 
result AT is another point on the curve. 
8 Key length in bits for equivalent security. Also see Table 2. 
This  multiplication  is  computed  by  a  sequence  of 
doublings and additions of the elliptic curve point (akin to 
the shift-and-add chains that were used for multiplication 
of two polynomials). Consider: 
 
a P AT ´ = , where a = (1001) = x
3 + 1, then 
P P P AT + + + = ...  
 
 
Or, equivalently 
P P AT + ´ ´ ´ = ) 2 ) 2 ) 2 (((  
 
The point addition and point doubling operations are 
described in Algorithms 8 and 9 respectively. Both point 
addition and point doubling operations reduce to a series 
of  polynomial  operations  (Table  4),  which  we  have 
described in Section 4. 
 
Algorithm 8
9 Adding two distinct points on an elliptic 
curve 
INPUT: Elliptic curve points  ) , ( 1 1 y x P =  and 
) , ( 2 2 y x Q = ,  Q P ¹   
OUTPUT:  ) , ( 3 3 y x Q P R = + =  
1. Compute 
1 2
1 2
x x
y y
+
+
= q . 
2. Compute  a x x x + + + + = 2 1
2
3 q q . 
3. Compute  1 3 3 1 3 ) ( y x x x y + + + =q . 
4. Return  ) , ( 3 3 y x . 
 
Algorithm 9
9 Doubling a point on an elliptic curve 
INPUT: Elliptic curve point  ) , ( y x P =  
OUTPUT:  ) , ( 3 3 y x P P R = + =  
1. Compute 
x
y
x+ = q . 
2. Compute  a x + + = q q
2
3 . 
3. Compute  3
2
3 ) 1 ( x x y + + = q . 
4. Return  ) , ( 3 3 y x . 
 
                                                 
9 In the equations, a is the coefficient of the 
2 x  term in the elliptic 
curve  equation.  For  each  binary  field,  NIST  [21]  recommends  two 
different  elliptic  curves:  a  random  curve  and  a  Koblitz  curve.  Both 
curves  are  of  the  form  b ax x xy y + + = +
2 3 2 ,  where  1 = a   and 
) 2 ( GF
k bÎ  for random curves, and  } 1 , 0 { Î a  and  1 = b  for  Koblitz 
curves. 
9 times  
Table 4 Number of polynomial operations in point 
addition and point doubling operations 
 
Polynomial 
operation 
Point 
doubling 
Point 
addition 
Addition  5  9 
Multiplication  2  2 
Reduction  4  3 
Squaring  2  1 
Inversion  1  1 
 
Alice    Bob 
Choose random a 
] 1 , 2 [ - Î n a  
  Choose random 
b,  ] 1 , 2 [ - Î n b  
Compute AT 
a P AT ´ =  
  Compute BT 
b P BT ´ =  
Send AT  
Receive BT 
AT ￿ 
￿ BT 
Receive AT  
Send BT 
Choose random k 
] 1 , 2 [ - Î n k  
   
Compute pair (C1,C2) 
) , ( T m B k P k P ´ + ´ =  
   
Send (C1,C2)  (C1,C2) ￿  Receive (C1,C2) 
    Compute Pm = 
1 2 C b C ´ -  
 
Figure 3 Elliptic-curve ElGamal 
 
7. EC-ElGamal, EC-DSA, AES and SHA 
 
Elliptic-curve ElGamal (EC-ElGamal) (Figure 3) is the 
elliptic-curve  analog  of  the  integer  ElGamal  algorithm 
described  in  [4].  It  is  used  to  securely  transmit  the 
coordinates of the point Pm from Alice to Bob (assume 
that  the  original  plaintext  m  is  embedded  in  Pm).  We 
assume that Alice and Bob have previously agreed on a 
binary  field  GF(2
k),  a  common  elliptic  curve  E  with 
suitable coefficients
6, and a base point P=(x,y), which lies 
on E and has order n.  
Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-DSA) 
is based on the ElGamal algorithm and has three different 
segments:  key  generation,  signature  generation  and 
signature  verification.  These  steps  are  summarized  in 
Figure  4,  where  Alice  signs  the  message  m  and  Bob 
verifies the signature.  
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) became the 
new  U.S.  federal  standard  for  block  encryption  in 
November 2001 [17]. It can encrypt and decrypt 128-bit, 
196-bit and 256-bit blocks. The key length is also variable 
and can be 128 bits, 196 bits or 256 bits. Compared to the 
DES/3DES [19] algorithms it is intended to replace, AES 
is  designed  to  have  exceptionally  fast  software 
implementations  and  small  code  size.  In  addition,  its 
small  memory  requirements  make  it  suitable  for 
constrained environments such as smartcards. 
 
Key generation (by Alice) 
1.  Choose random  ] 1 , 2 [ - Î n a  
2.  Compute the intermediate point AT 
a P AT ´ =  
Alice’s private key = a  
Alice’s public key = (E,P,AT) 
Signature generation (by Alice) 
1.  Choose random  ] 1 , 2 [ - Î n k  
2.  Compute  ) , ( 1 1 y x k P = ´  
and 
n x r mod 1 =  (if r = 0, go to Step 1) 
3.  Compute  n k mod
1 -  
4.  Compute 
n ar (m) k s mod ) SHA (
1 + =
-
 
(if s = 0, go to Step 1) 
Signature for m = (r,s) 
5.  Send (r,s) 
Signature verification (by Bob) 
Receive (r,s) 
1.  Compute  n s c mod
1 - =  
and 
SHA(m) 
2.  Compute  n c m u mod ) ( SHA 1 =   
and  n rc u mod 2 =  
3.  Compute  
) , ( 2 1 o o T y x u A u P = ´ + ´   
and 
n x v mod 0 =  
4.  Accept signature if  r v =  
 
Figure 4
10 Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
 
Detailed  descriptions  of  the  AES  algorithm  can  be 
found in [2,6] including some optimizations. We report 
our  findings  in  workload  characterization  for  two  AES 
implementations.  The  first  is  the  reference 
implementation,  the  second  is  a  table-lookup  based 
optimized implementation, both described in [2]. 
The  Secure  Hash  Algorithm  (SHA)  is  part  of  the 
Secure Hash Standard SHS [22]. It is a message-digest 
function that reads a variable-length input and produces a 
160-bit hash of the input. The function that computes the 
hash  is  one-way,  meaning  that  it  is  computationally 
infeasible to search for an input that evaluates to a given 
hash  value.  Because  of  this  one-way  property,  SHA  is 
used  in  the  Digital  Signature  Standard  [21]  to  increase 
efficiency.  Instead  of  signing  a  long  message,  only  the 
hash of the message is signed. 
 
 
                                                 
10 SHA(m) represents the hash of the message m computed with the 
Secure Hash Algorithm described in Section 7 and in [22].  
8. Methodology and discussion of results 
 
8.1 Methodology 
 
All  the  algorithms  are  coded  and  optimized  in 
assembly using simple RISC instructions that execute in a 
single cycle. Assembly coding minimizes the code size, 
which  is  important  for  constrained  environments.  The 
RISC ISA has a 64-bit datapath and 32 general integer 
registers. Of these, R31 is used as stack pointer, R30 as 
frame pointer. R0 is hardwired to zero; any value written 
to it is discarded. Only 22 simple instructions are actually 
used,  and  these  are  listed  in  Table  5.  Since  these 
instructions are a subset of the PLX processor, we use the 
PLX  architectural  testbed  and  tools  for  the  simulations 
and workload characterization [11,12,13,14]. 
 
Table 5 Instructions in the basic RISC ISA grouped by 
instruction classes 
 
Arithmetic 
 
add 
addi 
sub 
subi 
loadi 
 
Logical 
 
and 
andi 
or 
xor 
not 
Shift 
 
sll 
slli 
srl 
srli 
sra 
srai 
 
Unconditional 
branch 
 
call 
ret 
 
Conditional 
branch 
 
beqz 
bnez 
Load/Store 
 
load 
store 
 
 
In Table 7, we report instruction frequencies for each 
of  the  polynomial  operation  algorithms  described  in 
Section 4. We then select two subsets of these algorithms, 
to  achieve  a  basic  implementation  (Setting  I)  and  an 
optimized  implementation  (Setting  II)  of  the  ECC 
algorithms (see Table 6). Setting I simulates the simpler 
algorithms for each polynomial operation. Shift-and-add 
method  (Algorithm  2)  is  used  for  multiplication  and 
squaring,  and  extended  Euclidean  algorithm  (Algorithm 
6)  is  used  for  inversion.  Setting  II  uses  the  optimized 
algorithms. Here, comb method (Algorithm 3) is used for 
multiplication, Algorithm 4 is used for reduction, table-
lookup method (Algorithm 5) is used for squaring, and the 
modified Almost Inverse Algorithm (Algorithm 7) is used 
for inversion. In both Settings I and II, Algorithm 1 is 
used for polynomial addition. 
For  the  elliptic-curve  algorithms,  we  compute 
workload results for each of the ten curves recommended 
in [21], although for space reasons, we report results only 
for key size of 163 bits in Table 7, and for 163 bits and 
233 bits in Table 8.  
For  the  cycle  counts  and  speedup  calculations,  we 
keep the microarchitecture simple by simulating a single-
issue  processor.  We  assume  a  perfect  memory  system, 
where the memory accesses for loads and stores take a 
single  cycle.  Instructions  are  scheduled  to  eliminate  or 
minimize the pipeline stalls caused by data dependencies. 
 
Table 6 Arithmetic algorithms used in each setting (the 
numbers refer to the algorithms described in Section 4) 
 
Polynomial 
operation 
I 
(Basic) 
II 
(Optimized) 
Multiplication  2  3 
Reduction  N/A  4 
Squaring  2  5 
Inversion  6  7 
Addition  1  1 
 
8.2 Discussion of results 
 
For many of the polynomial operation algorithms in 
Table 7, the memory instructions (loads and stores) are as 
frequent as the compute instructions (arithmetic, logical, 
and  shift).  Exceptions  are  the  reduction  algorithm 
(Algorithm 4) and the inversion algorithms (Algorithms 6 
and 7), which are slightly more compute-intensive. The 
high percentage of memory instructions (25% to 49%) is 
due to two factors: (1) the function call overhead, which 
involves  saving  and  restoring  register  states  at  each 
function call, and (2) the large size of the polynomials, 
which  cannot  be  kept  in  the  register  file  during 
computations  and  must  be  written  to  and  read  from 
memory  frequently.  Arithmetic  instructions  have  over 
30%  share  for  Algorithms  1,  2  and  6,  while  shift 
instructions are also prominent in Algorithms 3, 4, 5 and 7 
with 19% to 28% share. Of the logical instructions, the 
xor  is  the  most  frequent  one  because  it  performs  the 
basic polynomial addition operation.  
Table 8 shows the speedup attainable by using more 
optimized  software  algorithms  for  the  different 
polynomial operations in the three ECC algorithms. This 
speedup is huge, from 12 to 17 times faster with software 
optimization. Otherwise, the instruction class distribution 
is roughly consistent across different field lengths, as well 
as different algorithms. For all algorithms and field sizes 
in Setting I, compute instructions comprise 48% to 51% 
of the instructions, while memory instructions comprise 
31% to 38% of the instructions executed. In Setting II, 
compute instructions comprise a reduced 34% to 40% of 
the  instructions,  while  memory  instructions  comprise  a 
larger 45% to 48% of the instructions executed. Looking 
more closely, arithmetic instructions decrease from over 
30% of the instruction mix in Setting I to under 20% in 
Setting  II.  The  other  instruction  classes  (logical,  shift, 
branches)  keep  roughly  the  same  percentages,  while 
stores  increase  slightly,  from  Setting  I  to  II.  The 
algorithmic  optimizations  appear  to  provide  speedup 
mainly by reducing arithmetic instructions. 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
11 Instruction class frequencies in Algorithms 1-7 
 
Algorithm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Elliptic curve from [21] BR-163 BR-163 BR-163 BR-163 BR-163 BR-163 BR-163
Class (%)
Arithmetic 35.29 33.51 10.95 9.16 8.58 33.50 11.66
Logical 5.88 7.30 8.19 23.24 18.96 8.98 25.00
Shift 1.47 7.43 25.60 25.35 18.51 7.90 28.39
Unconditional branch 5.88 4.25 5.32 2.82 6.61 6.94 5.37
Conditional branch 5.88 8.19 0.60 0.70 0.70 9.67 4.68
Load 20.59 23.26 25.22 17.61 24.45 19.14 12.45
Store 25.01 16.06 24.12 21.12 22.19 13.87 12.45
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Compute instructions 42.64 48.24 44.74 57.75 46.05 50.38 65.05
Memory instructions 45.60 39.32 49.34 38.73 46.64 33.01 24.90
Pathlength (thousands) 68.0 175.8 73.2 142.0 714.5 721.0 47.1
Cycles (thousands) 68.0 175.8 73.2 142.0 714.5 721.0 47.1
Speedup 1 1 2.40 1 1 1 15.28
 
 
 
Table 8
12 Instruction class frequencies in elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange, elliptic-curve El-Gamal, and 
elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
 
Algorithm
Elliptic curve from [21]
Simulation setting I II I II I II I II I II I II
Class (%)
Arithmetic 32.68 15.78 33.59 19.41 32.26 17.90 33.78 20.12 31.70 16.09 30.72 17.40
Logical 7.37 9.55 8.43 9.29 7.38 9.27 8.14 9.47 12.33 13.10 11.82 13.58
Shift 8.35 9.30 7.42 9.85 8.42 8.86 7.04 9.62 7.95 10.14 7.29 9.46
Unconditional branch 4.22 8.20 7.88 6.59 7.36 7.92 8.02 7.3 7.64 6.61 6.45 7.29
Conditional branch 8.41 9.95 8.78 7.99 8.88 7.82 8.97 7.37 8.81 8.10 8.11 7.02
Load 23.17 24.44 22.45 25.14 22.63 23.29 23.72 25.84 19.89 25.33 22.54 26.53
Store 15.80 22.78 11.45 21.73 13.07 24.93 10.33 20.28 11.69 20.62 13.07 18.72
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Compute instructions 48.40 34.63 49.44 38.55 48.06 36.03 48.96 39.22 51.97 39.33 49.83 40.44
Memory instructions 38.97 47.22 33.90 46.87 35.70 48.22 34.05 46.11 31.57 45.95 35.61 45.25
Pathlength (millions) 74.6 5.2 184.9 14.4 106.0 6.3 270.6 16.6 136.2 8.9 350.0 19.6
Cycles (millions) 74.6 5.2 184.9 14.4 106.0 6.3 270.6 16.6 136.2 8.9 350.0 19.6
Speedup 1 14.48 1 12.88 1 16.88 1 16.31 1 15.26 1 17.86
Elliptic-curve DSA
BR-163 BR-233
Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
BR-163 BR-233
Elliptic-curve ElGamal
BR-163 BR-233
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 The elliptic curves are identified by two letters followed by a three-digit number. The first two letters, BR, indicate that the underlying field is a binary 
field (B), and the elliptic curve is a random curve (R) as described in Footnote 9. The three-digit number indicates the size of the field. Test input for 
Algorithm 1 is 1,000 randomly initialized polynomial pairs. Test inputs for Algorithms 2 and 3 are 10 randomly initialized polynomial pairs. Test input 
for Algorithm 4 is 1,000 randomly initialized oversized (up to 325 bits long) polynomials. Test input for Algorithm 5 is 1,000 randomly initialized 
polynomials. Test inputs for Algorithms 6 and 7 are single randomly initialized polynomials. 
12 The figures for the elliptic-curve algorithms are for the completion of the entire two-party transaction as illustrated in Figures 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
For the elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm, the signed message is a randomly initialized 128-bit block.  
 
 
 
Table 9
13 Instruction class frequencies in AES and SHA 
Algorithm SHA
Simulation setting Basic w/ Table lookups Basic
Class (%)
Arithmetic 29.11 20.35 27.77
Logical 17.61 28.32 26.08
Shift 16.30 34.51 17.55
Unconditional branch 7.09 0.00 8.50
Conditional branch 8.72 0.88 8.56
Load 21.17 15.94 5.56
Store 0.00 0.00 5.98
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00
Compute instructions 63.02 83.18 71.40
Memory instructions 21.17 15.94 11.54
Pathlength (millions) 9.5 1.1 1
Cycles (millions) 9.5 1.1 1
Speedup 1 8.6 1
AES
 
 
 
Table 10 Ratio of instructions executed for BR-233 curve to the instructions for BR-163 curve 
 
Algorithm
Simulation setting I II I II I II
Arithmetic 2.55 3.43 2.67 2.97 2.49 2.37
Logical 2.83 2.71 2.82 2.70 2.47 2.28
Shift 1.20 1.95 1.14 1.87 1.36 1.05
Unconditional branch 4.63 2.24 2.78 2.44 2.17 2.42
Conditional branch 2.59 2.24 2.58 2.49 2.37 1.90
Load 2.40 2.86 2.68 2.93 2.91 2.30
Store 1.80 2.66 2.02 2.15 2.87 1.99
TOTAL 2.48 2.79 2.55 2.64 2.57 2.20
EC-DSA EC-DHKE EC-ElGamal
 
 
 
Table 11 Reduction of instruction executed when optimized algorithms are used (Setting II) instead 
of the basic algorithms (Setting I) 
 
Algorithm
Elliptic curve from [21] BR-163 BR-233 BR-163 BR-233 BR-163 BR-233
Arithmetic 29.99 22.30 30.41 27.37 30.06 31.53
Logical 11.17 11.69 13.43 14.01 14.36 15.54
Shift 13.00 9.71 16.06 11.93 11.96 13.76
Unconditional branch 7.45 15.41 15.69 17.91 17.64 15.80
Conditional branch 12.24 14.16 19.16 19.85 16.59 20.64
Load 13.73 11.51 16.40 14.97 11.98 15.17
Store 10.04 6.79 8.85 8.31 8.65 12.47
TOTAL 14.48 12.88 16.88 16.31 15.26 17.86
EC-ElGamal EC-DSA EC-DHKE
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Test input for AES is a sequence of 1,000 randomly initialized 128-bit blocks. A 128-bit key is used. Test input for SHA is the second test vector 
given in [22] replicated 1000 times.  
Table 12 Ratio of the instruction class frequencies in EC-ElGamal and EC-DSA to EC-DHKE 
 
Algorithm
Elliptic curve from [21]
Simulation setting I II I II I II I II
Arithmetic 0.99 1.13 1.01 1.04 0.97 1.02 0.91 0.90
Logical 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.02 1.67 1.37 1.40 1.46
Shift 1.01 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.95 1.09 0.98 0.96
Unconditional branch 1.74 0.97 1.02 1.11 1.81 0.81 0.82 1.11
Conditional branch 1.06 0.79 1.02 0.92 1.05 0.81 0.92 0.88
Load 0.98 0.95 1.06 1.03 0.86 1.04 1.00 1.06
Store 0.83 1.09 0.90 0.93 0.74 0.91 1.14 0.86
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BR-233 BR-163 BR-233
EC-ElGamal EC-DSA
BR-163
 
 
 
Table 9 shows that AES and SHA are both compute-
intensive.  The  optimized  setting  of  AES  (with  table 
lookups)  has  83%  compute  instructions  and  16% 
memory  instructions,  while  SHA  has  71%  compute 
instructions and 11% memory instructions. Of the two 
simulation  settings  for  AES,  arithmetic  operations  are 
converted to table lookups in the second setting, which 
results in a reduced percentage of arithmetic operations, 
but  increased  percentage  of  shift  and  logical 
instructions. The shift instructions are used in the table 
lookups for effective address computations; the logical 
instructions  (primarily  xor)  are  used  to  combine  the 
results of table lookups [2,6]. 
Table 10, derived from Table 8, shows the increase 
in the ratio of dynamic instruction counts when the field 
size is increased from 163 bits to 233 bits. For example, 
the first value in this table is 2.55, which indicates that 
the EC-DHKE on the 233-bit field contains 2.55 times 
as many arithmetic instructions as the EC-DHKE on the 
163-bit field, in simulation Setting I. We observe that 
overall, dynamic instruction counts increase from 2.2 to 
2.8 times their previous levels. This shows the expected 
non-linearity in the complexity of the algorithms. While 
the field size increases to 1.42 times its previous value 
(163 bits to 233 bits), the pathlength of the algorithms 
increases to about 2.5 times its previous value. 
Table 11 shows the ratio of the dynamic instruction 
counts from Setting I to Setting II for each algorithm 
and field size. This data is useful in understanding where 
the speedups are achieved. For example, the first value 
in this table is 29.99, which shows that the EC-DHKE 
that uses the basic algorithms contains about 30 times as 
many  arithmetic  instructions  as  when  it  uses  the 
optimized algorithms. Overall, we observe that using the 
optimized  algorithms  reduces  the  dynamic  instruction 
counts  by  12  to  17  times.  Arithmetic  instructions  are 
reduced 22 to 31 times, while other instruction classes 
are  only  reduced  between  7  to  20  times.  This  again 
suggests  that  the  speedups  obtained  from  optimized 
algorithms  come  primarily  through  reductions  in  the 
arithmetic instruction counts. 
Table  12  compares  the  relative  instruction 
frequencies  of  the  three  elliptic  curve  algorithms 
studied.  The  values  in  this  table  are  the  ratios  of  the 
instruction frequencies of EC-ElGamal and EC-DSA to 
the instruction frequencies of EC-DHKE, which is the 
base algorithm because of its simplicity. For example, 
the first value in this table is 0.99, which shows that the 
frequency of the arithmetic instructions in EC-ElGamal 
is 0.99 times the frequency of the arithmetic instructions 
in  EC-DHKE  under  Setting  I  on  a  163-bit  field.  In 
general, the ratios across all instruction classes are close 
to 1 for both EC-ElGamal and EC-DSA. This is because 
of the similarity of the algorithms; they all are based on 
elliptic-curve point multiplication. The only significant 
divergence is in the share of the logical instructions for 
EC-DSA, which is about 1.5 times as high as in EC-
DHKE.  This  is  because  the  EC-DSA  includes  SHA 
computations,  which  drives  up  the  logical  instruction 
count. As Table 9 indicates, SHA is heavily reliant on 
logical instructions. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
The contributions of this paper are: (1) a selection of 
cryptography  algorithms  suitable  for  constrained 
environments, (2) a description of the operations used by 
Elliptic  Curve  Cryptography  algorithms,  (3)  a 
characterization  of  the  instructions  executed  by  these 
algorithms,  and  (4)  demonstration  that  a  simple 
processor  is  sufficient.  We  show  the  operations  and 
instructions needed by elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange, elliptic-curve ElGamal, elliptic-curve Digital 
Signature  Algorithm,  elliptic-curve  arithmetic 
operations, the Advanced Encryption Standard, and the 
Secure  Hash  Algorithm.  The  importance  of  these 
algorithms is  verified by the fact that all of them are 
either standards by themselves, or are part of a larger 
standard. 
For  the  elliptic  curve  algorithms,  we  focused  our 
implementations on binary fields using polynomial basis 
representation.  We  compute  workload  results  for  the  
settings  recommended  by  NIST  in  [21].  We  also 
described  some  of  the  arithmetic  algorithms  used  to 
implement  elliptic-curve  operations  and  presented 
instruction  frequency  distributions  for  each  of  these 
algorithms.  
We  show  that  these  powerful  and  mathematically 
complicated  algorithms  can  be  implemented  very 
efficiently  using  a  simple  RISC-style  processor  with 
only  22  single-cycle  instructions,  implemented  by  an 
ALU (Arithmetic Logic Unit) and a shifter. An integer 
multiplier is not needed. 
For future work, we plan to expand our algorithm set 
to include other elliptic-curve algorithms, different block 
ciphers,  signature  algorithms  and  hash  functions.  We 
will also expand our ECC results to include results for 
prime fields, using bases other than polynomial bases, 
and  different  coordinate  systems  such  as  projective 
coordinates. 
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